Our Man in Riyadh: Norman Roule on Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Middle East
"With Saudi Arabia, the less you know about the relationship, the more likely you are to say it's transactional, and it's all about oil for protection."
President Biden is headed to Saudi Arabia and Israel next month. Over the coming days, he will be briefed for the critical summit by the best analysts, spies and operatives the U.S. intelligence community has to offer. Sadly, they don’t actually arrive in Aston Martins and serve dry martinis (shaken not stirred) anymore, but they do share incredible and important intel and insights. To give you a bit of the experience, we’ve called on one of our favorite Central Intelligence Agency alums: Norman Roule. Many people claim to know about the Middle East, but Norm really does, having served for more than three decades in the CIA, a career that included a stint as our station chief in Saudi Arabia and several years as the most senior Iran expert for the Director of National Intelligence. The remarkable tour d’horizon printed below is your own Middle East briefing in which Norm explains the latest on US-Saudi relations and what to expect from the trip, the Iran nuclear deal, Israel and the Abraham Accords, and potential terrorism risks. And he also warns (spoiler alert!) that a tanker called the FSO Safer floating off the coast of Yemen could be a catastrophic wild card for oil markets.
Octavian Report: What's the significance of President Biden's trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel next month?
Norman Roule: The way I would look at this first is that the President has visited Asia and Europe and it's time for him to make a trip to the Middle East. There's going to be an Israel trip, and that will involve engagement with the Israelis and the Palestinians, and that's going to be a complicated visit. There's likely to be a GCC meeting, meetings with the Jordanians and Egyptians, and these meetings will involve bilateral discussions with the host country, where he is located, and with the various leaders he meets. I think he might look for some sort of a gathering of the Abraham Accords. And this might bring in Morocco. And last, I think we should also expect that maybe India plays some role in this.
There will be a couple of locations. Israel gives you the Abraham Accords as well as Palestinian issues while the Gulf Cooperation Council headquarters are in Riyadh and the Saudi relationship is pivotal to U.S. security.
Bilateral sidebar discussions are going to be extraordinarily complicated and considerable. With Saudi Arabia, the less you know about the relationship, the more likely you are to say it's transactional, and it's all about oil for protection. But I think you're going to see the following issues discussed in Saudi Arabia: Energy, including green energy. Secretary Kerry has made multiple trips to the Gulf, and my understanding is he's been quite impressed by Gulf investment in green energy, which itself isn't surprising, given the impact of climate change in their region. This may also be a good time to move forward the multi-year discussions we've been having with Saudi Arabia on nuclear energy. I think the issue of oil is going to come up, but I don't see the Saudis believing they can do much to impact the market without incurring some significant risks.
I think the president is also going to talk technology, and not just green energy technology: water, hydrogen production, carbon capture and use, also mining, cyber defense, and even space issues, where the Saudis have made considerable investments in the last year. You'll see some agricultural discussions take place. And of course, security discussions will touch Iran, Yemen, China, Russia, and East Africa. And those will be a very complicated series of discussions that I think will make it a very demanding trip.
OR: Are people in the region right now feeling good about the U.S. or are they concerned about our reliability?
Roule: I'm in frequent contact with a number of regional leaders and I can say with some confidence that certainly late last year and early last autumn, there were deep concerns about the United States' reliability, but many of those concerns have been obviated or at least are being resolved through intense diplomatic engagement. But you need to think about how the United States fits into their view of the world because we are in an increasingly multipolar environment, and recent events have shown people in the region that the great powers are not what they thought they'd be.
China is willing to sell absolutely anything, from weapons to pencils, to anyone in the region, from Iran to Saudi Arabia, but it's utterly indifferent to their security concerns. China is a geo-commercial or economic power, not a geopolitical or geo-strategic power.
Russia, on the other hand, is increasingly viewed as malign but absolutely vindictive. Russia can be part of problems, never part of solutions, and Russia's presence in the region is troubling. And not a lot of people have paid attention to it, but Russia is building a naval base in Port Khartoum capable of holding four nuclear power submarines. That's in the middle of the Red Sea, which holds a lot of the world's trade.
So, finally you get to the United States. It's less reliable. It's less focused on the region than it used to be, but it's ultimately the best security and trade and cultural guarantor. This is a multipolar world, and the region is thinking how they fit into it.
OR: How do the Iran nuclear talks play into that?
Roule: I've been watching this issue for a lot of years, going back to the first European nuclear talks in 2003 and 2004. But even prior to that we started to have concerns about Iran's nuclear program. I think the likelihood of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2.0 is very, very low. That doesn't mean that a nuclear deal isn't possible, but we just need to ensure that we don't confuse it with the prior deal. A new nuclear deal will certainly, based on what is in the press, constrain Iran's nuclear program with diminishing constraints through 2031. And in 2031, they'll be quite capable of producing whatever sort of weapons grade material they wish.
A nuclear deal will have no impact on Iran’s regional activities or its missile programs. A nuclear deal will lift sanctions, and although there will be terrorism and human rights sanctions on Iran, we shouldn't kid ourselves that the most significant sanctions won’t be reduced. And this will allow Iran to build up the same sort of fortress economy that Putin attempted to build in 2014. There will be diminished great power unity and diminished capability for rapid sanctions impact.
A deal does bring benefits by constraining the program. The question becomes, what do we do with that time? If you get a new nuclear deal, what's your plan so that we don't end up exactly where we ended up after several years of the JCPOA, where people have not unreasonably stated, look, we didn't see a lot of effort to push Iran back in the region or curtail its missile program. Engagement didn't soften the regime, and Iran used that time to weaponize its proxies in a way that has changed the power dynamic. How do we know that's not going to happen again in the next eight years? Those are reasonable questions people should ask on a deal.
OR: How stable do you think the Iranian regime is right now?
Roule: There's no evidence that Iran's regime is facing collapse. The security forces remain relatively cohesive and well-resourced. Unrest is a constant in Iran. There are hundreds of demonstrations every year, but I've yet to see evidence that discontented elites have formed a power block against the Iranian government. I don't see a power block within Iran or outside of Iran capable of opposing the regime. But this is a regime that is very unpopular. It rules through coercion. It rules through violence. It's one of those regimes that no one can predict when it will go away, but when it does, everyone will say that its demise was inevitable.
OR: Are you worried about nuclear proliferation in the region?
Roule: I don't see nuclear proliferation being a concern in the immediate future, meaning the next year or two. But we should all be very concerned about the impact of Iran's missile proliferation and drone actions throughout the region. Let's look at Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for a moment. Prior to the Ukraine conflict, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent the U.A.E., received more attacks by Iranian missiles and drones than any country since the Second World War, when the Germans were attacking the United Kingdom. They did not respond against Iran. They did not build a missile program of their own to deter Iran. Instead they relied upon using American equipment for what was, by and large, an extraordinarily successful defense.
But you have such an enormous target area and it's just impossible to defend everything all at once. And therefore, some missile strikes did occur. Iran paid no price for those actions, and we're talking hundreds of missile and drone attacks on almost exclusively civilian targets. The Houthis and Iran have rarely attacked military targets and they tend to focus on airports, cities, and energy locations. These are targets meant to produce mass casualties, upset global economies, and produce a lot of publicity.
So, if you were in the Saudi government or the Emirati government, and you are having this happen over and over, at what point do you say, "I need my own missile program to just offer a deterrent," just as the Americans built such a program against the Russians during the Cold War, and we still maintain this against Russia or China. Why are they different? I think this is a real concern we should all have: that unless this violence from Iran is contained, you could ignite a missile and drone race in the region, which could be tremendously destabilizing to global trade and energy as well as to the civilians who live in that area.
OR: Do you think there could be a full-blown war, whether intentional or accidental, between the Iranians and the Israelis?
Roule: Iran has consistently scoped its attacks in a way that is below the level of something that would cause a conventional conflict. It has launched cyberattacks, drone attacks, occasional terrorist attacks. This isn't at the level of something that would ignite a war. Now, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapon, I think the likelihood of a conventional war increases significantly because Israel, which is the only country that Iran consistently talks about eradicating — indeed its missiles have had "Death to Israel" written in pretty good Hebrew on them — it won't be able to take a chance that Iran is bluffing. It will have to respond, based upon its history. So the ball is in Iran's court. If Iran is less aggressive, then the likelihood drops, but if Iran does something foolish, Israel will respond. I have no doubt of that.
OR: What do you think the chances are they do that in the next couple years?
Roule: I think it's less likely than some think. You have to think about what Iran's goals are in the region and internally. In many ways, they're quite similar to what Putin is seeking. Iran seeks to unravel the international fabric because multi-polarity and a fragmented traditional alliance structure allows it the chance for regional hegemony. So it then seeks to assert its power in the near abroad, generally through proxies, which, at the current time, will need to undergo a transformation, from malicious to political actors, in places like Syria, Iraq, even Yemen, and develop an identity similar to that of Lebanese Hezbollah and Lebanon itself. And last, Iran wishes to demonstrate that the U.S. and Western countries are unable to impact its actions.
Iran has a number of goals in the nuclear talks. First, they want to retain industrial enrichment. They will close no sites. They insist upon being able to build a more advanced program, and they want a nuclear deal that gives them a normalcy at some point, that they're treated like every other country. But Iran wants its revolutionary identity treated as a normal identity. So, for this reason, Iran drags out talks because doing so allows it to expand its nuclear program. And that tests Western tolerance, establishes a new normal, and that more advanced program can be used as a lever against other concessions. Iran also uses talks to engage with Western powers to, in essence, show that it's one of the big boys. Iran is a medium-sized country, highly corrupt, not very profitable for Western businesses, with a large brilliant population, but it's not a great power. But here it is at a table with Russia, China, the United States, Britain, and not only at the table but dictating when talks will take place, what the talks will cover, and whether the United States sits at the table.
I think Iran seeks to use the talks and this coming period of a year or two to collapse the entire international sanctions regime. And this will allow it, in the next couple of years, to move through a period of transition from the revolutionary leadership, the Supreme leader, to that of the Iran-Iraq War generation. And for this reason, I think Iran might be driven to a deal, but only if it saw that its demands were provoking international unity which I think is unlikely or it begins to have some sort of economic problem internally that provokes political instability. I don't see that either. So in the near term, I don't see Iran going for a weapon. I see it provoking the West by saying, "Look, you better come up with concessions or I might do something crazy.” That's testing our fortitude and Iran is quite experienced at that.
OR: What's your view of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and do you see any progress in the offing?
Roule: I'm a pessimist in terms of any progress at the current time, but I want to applaud the Biden administration for its ongoing efforts. It's just hard to see that there's any space for a positive change. In Israel, you have a governing coalition composed of left-wing and right-wing parties who are unified in the idea that they shouldn't take any major initiatives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Then you have the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is viewed as weak and corrupt. It's not particularly effective in governance. The significant erosion of support by Arab countries for the Palestinian Authority is extraordinary testimony that the Arab countries themselves are impatient and tired of funding this architecture. Mahmoud Abbas is 87. That's not an age where people make significant concessions if they're trying to maintain a legacy. I do think Abbas is frustrated with the United States. He probably had higher hopes for the Biden administration coming in. And on the other side of the Palestinian issue, you have Hamas, extremely violent, corrupt, with poor governance, an Iranian proxy, and it simply cannot be allowed to expand its influence in the Palestinian entity because doing so would have extraordinary implications for the Palestinian people, for Israel, but also Jordan and the other neighbors in the region.
OR: What about the Abraham Accords? Do you think they're achieving what people hoped they would?
Roule: They're achieving what the architects of the Accords hoped, but these are early days. People-to-people exchanges have blossomed. Tourism has exploded in the region. Trade between the United Arab Emirates and Israel has skyrocketed. And when you compare the benefits from that, to, say, the cold peace between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, this is clearly something that the region is benefiting from. Morocco and Bahrain have has also seen an increase in trade and exchange. You're seeing the focus on the good things, medical technology, technological exchange, cyber defense, artificial intelligence, capital from the Gulf, Israeli innovation. It's flowing back and forth.
Many people look at the Abraham Accords as a security issue or something that would block Arab support for the Palestinians. We've seen the Emirates and Bahrain stand up for what they believe are Palestinian rights since the Abraham Accords. They haven't stopped confronting Israel when they feel they need to. They're just doing it diplomatically and face-to-face. I don't think a security relationship between these countries is something we should expect to happen quickly. Security often involves a tremendous amount of trust and familiarity and very deep engagement, and this will tend to grow slowly.
But when you look at the innovation and the economic growth between these countries and the popularity of the Abraham Accords in them, it is a significant undermining of Iran's narrative. And I think, in the long run, if you're in Iran, you have to wonder how you can technologically compete with the extraordinary transformation of the societies and the economies that you see in the Gulf and in Israel.
OR: Do you think the Saudis will recognize Israel at some point soon?
Roule: Relationships between Israel and the Kingdom are growing, but they're constrained by political realities. And I think, for each side, they recognize this must be a measured process. It doesn't hurt that there's an effervescent series of voices in the business communities pushing for this, but the Palestinian issue is an important one for the Saudis. I've spoken with senior Saudi leaders. They wish to see, first, that the Palestinians get their act together, and that means dealing with Hamas and improving internal governance. And at the same time, they want to see a two-state solution. So, the Palestinian position that the Saudis have held for many years hasn't changed. But we've watched the Saudis open up their airspace to Israel. They have endorsed the peace with their neighbors. These are all very positive steps. They're steps that we should applaud and should respond to the Saudis with some measures to show that we appreciate where they're going because more engagement, more dialogue, more peace is a wonderful thing for the Middle East.
OR: Can the Saudis do anything to influence the Palestinians in a different direction that would be more conducive to a two-state solution?
Roule: I don't think so. Saudi relations with Hamas are quite poor. They have made it a criminal offense to provide funding to Hamas, rightfully so, recognizing Hamas as a terrorist organization that attacks civilians. When Hamas rockets were fired on Jerusalem in the recent conflict, they were fired into an area that had a large Palestinian population, as well as Israeli. You were as likely to be a Palestinian hit by a Hamas rocket as you were an Israeli in that conflict. And I think the Saudis and the Gulf states recognize there's a limit to their influence with Mahmoud Abbas. But Abu Mazan, like all of us, will pass from this earthly realm at some point, and the Palestinians will have a chance to reconstitute themselves with a new and hopefully more enlightened, progressive, and impactful leadership.
I think, at that point, the Saudis and the other Gulf states will have a party with which to engage. Now, at the other end of this, if the Palestinians don't go down that road, I see no reason why the Saudis, especially as their population becomes more comfortable with the Israeli tourists that they bump into in neighboring states, also don't come to the decision that they will not hostage their regional foreign policy and economic policy to Palestinian political ineptitude and the fact that a large portion of the Palestinians choose to follow Tehran instead of voices of reason.
OR: After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, there was a lot of concern about the risk of a return of global terrorism. Are you worried about that?
Roule: I think we have really three slices of the terrorism issue to look at. In the United States, our greatest concern is militancy from the far right and that has changed how we look at terrorism. Sunni terrorists such as ISIS, al Qaeda, and offshoots, tend to have changed in the last few years. Under Bin Laden and his immediate lieutenants, their idea was a global terrorism revolution. What we are watching now is that these various groups have broken down into more country-based or regional-based structures, focused more on dominating their local countries. We have ISIS elements in more than a dozen African countries, and they range in size from dozens to thousands like with Boko Haram. If you look at Afghanistan, clearly, we don't have the intelligence picture we enjoyed when we had forces in country. We shouldn't dispute that. And I have no doubt that my former colleagues in the intelligence community and Biden administration and the military are doing everything they can to resolve that issue, but that's a hard reality. And here's your danger: some of the most significant threats that were produced by al Qaeda were produced in very, very small, compartmented cells in very distant locations. So, for example, at one time al Qaeda planned a dirty nuclear attack in the United States with a very small element working that. They planned a biological attack against the United States, and that was, in essence, conducted at a farm that had a sort of clean lab with a Pakistani scientist working. We should be really concerned that those types of small footprint events may be taking place in areas such as Somalia or Afghanistan, where we chose to pull out.
Now, a broader, different type of terrorism threat is that posed by Iran. We have seen, in the last year, press reports that Iranian agents have attempted to kidnap a dissident on U.S. soil and to take this dissident to Venezuela. We have seen press reports that the United States is spending millions of dollars to protect some former U.S. officials and perhaps some current U.S. officials from Iranian terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland now.
Now think about that: in the U.S. homeland, we are spending resources to protect Americans, including in the capital of the United States, from an Iranian terrorist threat. I think, if you spoke to the administration, they would likely say they have conveyed to the Iranians our commitment to a harsh response if Iran were to undertake this. But imagine in the post 9/11 environment, we are living in a world where we are spending money to defend people against terrorist attacks and we take no offensive action against those terrorist elements. That's quite a shift in our counterterrorism policy over a few years.
OR: Is there anything that no one's thinking about at the moment that we should be worried about in the region?
Roule: Two things. These are early days for the Ukraine conflict. And Iran's proliferation of missiles and drones remains a problem with catastrophic potential. So, let's talk about the first issue. If you look at the Ukraine conflict, nobody can predict how it plays out, but we shouldn't be surprised if we end up in a few months with something similar to Crimea. But this is going to be a long-term conflict. It looks like something where, even if we reach a cease fire, it'll be one of the cease fires that you see in parts of the Middle East, which is, there's a cease fire except for the violations in these four or five locations today. And that's going to have an impact on world energy and agriculture.
We haven't seen that play out yet in Africa and with emerging and developing states yet. Some countries are absolutely bereft of wheat reserves. Think about Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria in eight, nine months. The need to supply these countries with grains is going to impact Middle East stability and the stability of Africa. And people need to look at a map. Saudi Arabia is on the other side of some of the most unstable states in Africa, Eritrea, Somalia, et cetera. We need the Saudis and the others in the Gulf to play a positive role in stabilizing those countries to protect their civilians and to prevent terrorism. So, I worry the Ukraine conflict, as it plays out, has only begun to produce some of the ripples from this stone that was thrown in the water by the Russians, and these ripples have yet to really hit.
On Iran's proliferation of missiles, historians will look back and praise, appropriately, the Saudis and the Emiratis for their incredible air defense capacity. Hundreds of missiles and drones were fired at them and, thank God, the civilian fatalities were few. Unfortunately and tragically, a number of countries lost personnel from these attacks. But what if one of those missiles had hit an airplane at one of the airports the Houthis were targeting? Or a drone had struck a ship that blocked the mouth of the Red Sea? We all saw what one ship in the Suez Canal could do to supply lines.
One more last wild card: there is an oil tanker called the FSO Safer, which has four times the amount of oil as the Exxon Valdez. It is rotting and could explode at any minute off of the coast of Yemen. The United Nations has worked very hard with the United States and Europeans, particularly the Dutch, to fund the removal of the oil from that tanker. If that explodes, it will destroy, probably permanently, the livelihoods for two million Yemenis and impact eight million individuals in the region. And the oil will close the mouth of the Red Sea in the south for some period of time. This is something where we have to put a lot of international pressure on the Houthis to allow the United Nations to remove that oil and make that tanker safe.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.